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The Abandonment of Modernity: 
Bare Life and the Camp in Homo Sacer and Hotel Rwanda 
-Carolyn Owenby 
 
 In the introduction to his Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Giorgio Agamben 
identifies as a starting point Foucault’s concept of the biopolitical, of “the process by which, 
at the threshold of the modern era, natural life begins to be included in the mechanisms and 
calculations of State power” (3), while at the same time he regrets the fact that Foucault 
“never dwelt on the exemplary places of modern biopolitics: the concentration camp and the 
structure of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century” (4).  Picking up where he 
sees Foucault as leaving off, Agamben discusses not only sovereign power and the sovereign 
ban, the state of exception and the bare life that it necessarily produces, but also what he 
calls “the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West” (181) , the camp.  Over the course 
of the book, a political imperative surfaces: an injunction for the modern world—its 
subjects, its states, even its humanitarian organizations—to acknowledge the structure of 
exception which forms the framework of modernity, and to question this structure and its 
founding principles.  The book draws on events of modern history, particularly those 
associated with Nazi Germany, “interrogat[ing] the link between bare life and politics, a link 
that secretly governs the modern ideologies seemingly most distant from one another,” in an 
attempt to “bring the political out of its concealment” (4-5) and ultimately to encourage the 
development of a “completely new politics” (11).  In this project, I will focus both on 
Agamben’s text and on a text depicting another major biopolitical event in modern history—
Hotel Rwanda, a film about the Rwandan genocide of 1994—to explore Agamben’s claim that 
the state of exception has become the rule in modern nation-states, and to determine what, 
precisely, is at stake here.  
 
 In the realm of modern biopolitics (and therefore, Agamben argues, in the state of 
exception generally), the concept of citizenship assumes a position of particular importance.  
Agamben states that, “One of the essential characteristics of modern biopolitics… is its 
constant need to redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside 
and what is outside” (131).  The distinction between who is a citizen and who is not 
becomes crucial, and all sorts of criteria for determining citizenship and, more importantly, 
non-citizenship arise.  Using Nazi Germany as an example, Agamben explains that, “the 
answer to the question ‘Who and what is German?’ (and also, therefore, ‘Who and what is 
not German?’) coincides immediately with the highest political task” (130).  Those who are 
deemed non-citizens, non-Germans here, are then excluded from the law, abandoned by it 
and rendered politically irrelevant.  The same happens in Hotel Rwanda, where a group called 
the Interhamwe decides to distinguish citizenship on the basis of the categories of Hutu and 
Tutsi. The film reveals that these categories, established years prior by the Belgians, are 
essentially arbitrary: a foreign cameraman learns that the Belgians determined a person to be 
Hutu or Tutsi based on the length of their noses, but when he sees two women, one Hutu 
and one Tutsi, he says, “They could be twins” (14:19).  In another instance in the film, Pat 
Archer, an aid worker for the Red Cross, tells protagonists Paul and Tatiana Rusesabagina 
that she was forced to watch as Tutsi orphans were killed.  She recalls that, “There was one 
girl.  She had her little sister wrapped on her back.  As they’re about to chop her, she cried 
out to me, ‘please don’t let them kill me! I—I promise I won’t be Tutsi anymore!’” (47:28). 
The factors that determine citizenship here are outside of the individual’s control. Agamben 
insists that in the state of exception there is, “a new decision concerning the threshold 
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beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant… and can as such be eliminated without 
punishment.  Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides 
who its ‘sacred men’ will be” (139).  
 
In the film, the label “Tutsi” is enough to revoke a person’s citizenship, but at the 
same time, being a Hutu does not guarantee it, either.  Agamben explains that, in the state of 
exception, “citizenship was something of which one had to prove oneself worthy and which 
could therefore always be called into question” (132).  Throughout the film, Paul, himself a 
Hutu, must continually resist being reduced to his bare life and stripped of his citizenship, 
and the Hotel des Mille Collines here becomes a powerful symbol.  Paul insists that, “This is 
not a refugee camp,” and he continues to call it a hotel and the people it shelters “guests,” 
even after 800 refugees have arrived (38:45, 60:22).  Paul, who for the first half of the film is 
always dressed as a businessman, knows precisely what is at stake in maintaining himself as a 
citizen, a politically relevant person.  Speaking to the hotel staff and to the refugees, he says, 
“Most importantly, this cannot be a refugee camp.  The Interhamwe believe that the Mille 
Collines is a four-star Sabena hotel.  That is the only thing keeping us alive” (65:43). Even 
for Paul, in the state of exception there is always a sense of danger: when one’s citizenship 
may be put up for debate and repealed at any moment, in some sense the law has already 
abandoned him.  He has no appeal to the law if at once he is proclaimed not to belong.  
 
Once a person is denied this belonging, Agamben insists, he fully represents the 
figure of the homo sacer. There are two attributes that together characterize the homo sacer: 
“the unpunishability of his killing and the ban on his sacrifice” (73, original emphasis).  That is to say, 
any person who kills the homo sacer is not subject to punishment; this killing is not 
considered the crime of homicide.  Simultaneously, the homo sacer is not sacrificed or killed 
through a legally prescribed procedure, such as the death penalty.  The film’s Tutsi 
characters and those, like Paul, associated with them, are a clear example of homo sacer: none 
have been sentenced to death through legal means, but when the Interhamwe kill them, 
there is no recourse or punishment. In an early scene in the film, Paul, his wife Tatiana, and 
her brother Thomas look on as the army accuses their neighbor is of being a Tutsi spy, beats 
him, and takes him away.  Tatiana, horrified, insists that, “We  must do something… Call 
someone.”  Paul responds simply: “There is nothing we can do” (10:55).  During the 
genocide in Rwanda, as Paul recognizes here, the people were utterly abandoned by the law. 
Paul and others taking refuge at the Hotel des Mille Collines do make calls of appeal later in 
the film—to foreigners and in Paul’s case also to General Bizimungu of the Rwandan 
army—and some help does come from these calls: select families are granted exit visas, the 
attacks on the Mille Collines are postponed.  However, these events are always temporary, 
exclusionary; they come with a price and still are wrought with danger.  There is no 
guarantee of safety for the homo sacer.  When the exit visas are announced in the film by 
Colonel Oliver of the United Nations, the viewer feels a sense of relief, but there is 
simultaneously a sense of danger and hopelessness, for there are still more families left 
without aid.  Even those families fortunate enough to be granted exit visas are not protected 
within the state of exception: the U.N. convoy bringing them to safety is driven into an 
ambush of Hutu militiamen. 
 
The homo sacer stands outside the law, and is abandoned by it.  Agamben calls the 
homo sacer “simply set outside human jurisdiction without being brought into the realm of 
divine law” (82).  The homo sacer, external to the law, still, however, remains intimately 
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bound to it.  He does not simply have no relation to the law; he relates to the law precisely 
through his exclusion from it.  Agamben explains this as the sovereign ban of the homo 
sacer from the sovereign sphere—in other words, as the state of exception.  He says, “The 
original political relation is the ban (the state of exception as zone of indistinction between 
outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion)” (181).  Being excluded from the law, the homo 
sacer cannot appeal to the law; it cannot protect him.  His banishment from the sphere of 
law reduces him—from a politically relevant person, a citizen protected by the law and 
within the law—to his bare life alone.  As such, as a creature possessing bare life only, the 
homo sacer may become subject to death or punishment at the hands of anyone.  Agamben 
explains that in the state of exception, “human life is politicized only through an 
abandonment to an unconditional power of death” (90). Using the example of the Jew in 
Nazi Germany, Agamben identifies, “a flagrant case of homo sacer in the sense of a life that 
may be killed but not sacrificed.  His killing therefore constitutes… neither capital 
punishment nor a sacrifice, but simply the actualization of a mere ‘capacity to be killed’” 
(114).  The Jew in Nazi Germany demonstrates exactly those two traits Agamben has told us 
are always present in the homo sacer: his ability to be killed without being the vict im of 
homicide, and his inability to be sacrificed.  Agamben continues, saying, “The truth… is that 
the Jews were exterminated not in a mad and giant holocaust but exactly as Hitler had 
announced, ‘as lice,’ which is to say, as bare life” (114). In the same way, the exterminating 
Hutus, particularly the group called the Interhamwe, call the Tutsis “cockroaches” (00:52). 
The homo sacer no longer signifies anything beyond his bare life; he has no political 
relevance but for his mere existence outside the law, banished from the law, abandoned by it.  
Agamben explains, 
“The life caught in the sovereign ban is the life that is originarily sacred… and, in 
this sense, the production of bare life is the originary activity of sovereignty.  The 
sacredness of life, which is invoked today as an absolutely fundamental right in 
opposition to sovereign power, in fact originally expresses precisely both life’s 
subjection to a power over death and life’s irreparable exposure in the relation of 
abandonment” (83). 
 
Being abandoned by the law, and as such being reduced to bare life, does not necessarily 
indicate that the abandoned sovereign subject, the homo sacer, will be tortured, murdered, 
or the like (although this is not out of the realm of possibility, and indeed there always seems 
to be a sense of danger haunting the homo sacer).  It simply means the law no longer 
applies; the homo sacer cannot appeal to anyone for help, not to the law, the sovereign, or 
the police. 
 
 Hotel Rwanda demonstrates what is at stake for the individual when he is reduced to 
bare life and made into homo sacer.  It depicts the danger and the horrors that can exist in a 
state of exception, when law withdraws and abandons the individual.  What Agamben’s book 
further shows is how the structure of the state of exception is already at work in the 
dominant structure of modernity, and how the modern subject, despite whatever 
appearances may seem otherwise, is always already homo sacer.  Agamben makes several 
assertions about declarations of rights, democracy, and humanitarian organizations that, at 
first, seem contradictory or paradoxical.  However, it is through these assertions that the 
reader can decipher the political imperative of the book.  To begin, Agamben discusses 
declarations of rights, declarations that the modern subject often takes for granted as 
liberating, empowering, and protecting the individual.  Agamben makes it clear that this 
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understanding of these declarations entirely miss what is going on here.  He asserts that,  
“it is time to stop regarding declarations of rights as proclamations of eternal, 
metajuridical values binding the legislator (in fact, without much success) to respect 
eternal ethical principles, and to begin to consider them according to their real 
historical function in the modern nation-state.  Declarations of rights represent the 
originary figure of the inscription of natural life in the juridico-political order of the 
nation-state” (127). 
 
Declarations of rights, Agamben contends, rather than freeing individuals from state  power 
and control, more and more write them into the law.  Perhaps the best example of this 
comes in Agamben’s discussion of the right of habeas corpus.  Intended to “assure the 
presence of the accused at the trial and, therefore, to keep the accused from avoiding 
judgment” (125), habeas corpus also has another, more subversive effect.  Because it writes the 
body into the law—despite its ostensible purpose of protecting that body—the institution of 
habeas corpus makes the body subject to the law more than it was before.  Agamben says that 
habeas corpus “turns—in its new and definitive form—into grounds for the sheriff to detain 
and exhibit the body of the accused” (125). 
 
 Using this same logic, Agamben turns to a discussion of democratic and totalitarian 
states, revealing what to the modern subject seems to be an unsettling solidarity between the 
two.  He speaks of the rapidity “with which this century’s totalitarian states were able to be 
converted, almost without interruption, into parliamentary democracies” (122).  The most 
unsettling aspect of this scenario is the fact that the switch happens “almost without 
interruption,” and so the modern subject must question exactly how different democracy 
and totalitarianism are, really.  The reason for this “otherwise incomprehensible rapidity” 
(122) is precisely what Agamben explained concerning declarations of rights: the institution 
of ‘rights’ in democratic states also inscribes the subject more and more within the law and 
the state’s power.  Agamben explains that, “the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by 
individuals in their conflicts with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but 
increasing inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order” (121).  Democratic states, 
then, while advertising themselves as different from their totalitarian counterparts, as 
granting freedom to their citizens, really operate precisely like the totalitarian states do—
capturing, albeit covertly, the lives and bodies of the individuals within their power. 
 
 Revealing another perhaps shocking solidarity in the modern world, Agamben moves 
on to take issue with the structure of humanitarian organizations.  Where the modern subject 
ordinarily conceives of humanitarian organizations as in opposition to oppressive state 
power, Agamben reveals a secret complicity.  He says that these organizations, “can only 
grasp human life in the figure of bare or sacred life, and therefore, despite themselves, 
maintain a secret solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight” (133).  Because 
humanitarian organizations refuse to take political actions, because they simply cater to the 
bare life (and not the political existence) of the individual—clothing and feeding people—
Agamben insists that they operate “in perfect symmetry with state power” (133), 
perpetuating the structure of the state of exception instead of questioning and fighting it.  In 
Hotel Rwanda, the character of Colonel Oliver demonstrates this problem over and over 
again. When a U.N. convoy is attacked, an Interhamwe Hutu yells at Colonel Oliver, “Look, 
I told you, you’ve got cockroaches in your truck!”  The colonel responds, saying, “No, no, 
no.  They’re political refugees under U.N. sanction” (92:21).  What the colonel does not 
21 
 
realize is that here, still within the confines of Rwanda and in the state of exception, they are 
nothing more than bare life, more cockroaches than they are political refugees, in that they 
can simply be exterminated.  At another point in the film, Colonel Oliver tells a journalist, 
“We’re here as peace keepers, not peace makers.  My orders are not to intervene” (37:53).  
Even when the Interhamwe have killed several of the U.N.’s own soldiers, the men who 
guard the gate of the Mille Collines are not allowed to shoot.  Agamben, in response to this 
sort of ineffectual aid given by humanitarian organizations (indeed, why bother to feed them 
if they will die by machete in a day or two?), makes a statement that indicates the political 
imperative here.  He says, “A humanitarianism separated from politics cannot fail to 
reproduce the isolation of sacred life at the basis of sovereignty, and the camp—which is to 
say, the pure space of exception—is the biopolitical paradigm that it cannot master” (134).  
Separating out bare life, no matter for what purpose, creates and perpetuates the state of 
exception, the camp; in order to affect change, modern subjects must question the 
fundamental structure of these humanitarian organizations, of democracies and 
totalitarianisms.  In order to master this biopolitical paradigm of the camp, which is also the 
biopolitical paradigm of modernity, bare life can no longer be isolated.  
 
Agamben ultimately argues, as the title of his book’s third and final section indicates, 
that “The Camp [is the] Biopolitical Paradigm of the Modern.” Agamben explains—and 
texts like the film Hotel Rwanda demonstrate—precisely what is at stake in the state of 
exception, in the camp: the individual is reduced to his bare life, becoming homo sacer, and 
he is abandoned by the law; in this state, he is left vulnerable, without appeal, to the most 
horrifying violations and to the most gruesome death.  The supposedly liberating and 
protecting institutions of democracy and humanitarian organizations are ineffectual (in the 
film: the U.N.’s inability to protect the refugees, the refusal of military aid by the world’s 
leading Western democracies—the U.S., Britain, France), and they operate in symmetry and 
ultimately in complicity with oppressive totalitarian state powers. The film highlights how 
horrifying it is that modern subjects, particularly in the West, witness such atrocities, and do 
not act, through the words of the American photographer: “I think, if people see this 
footage [of the Rwandan massacres], they’ll say, ‘oh my God, that’s horrible,’ and then go on 
eating their dinners” (44:05).  At the same, however, time the film’s relatively happy ending 
allows the viewer to do precisely that. Agamben’s book, however, threatens its readers with 
the fate of the homo sacer, charges them to “learn to recognize” the “metamorphoses and 
disguises” (123) of the camp in the modern world, and also warns us that “There is no return 
from the camps to classical politics” (188).  Homo Sacer, then, is a text which forces its 
readers to rethink what they understand as political, free, democratic, etc., and to try—and it 
is imperative that they do—to find a new political relation, one which does not operate as a state 
of exception, and which does not, most importantly, produce the figure of homo sacer.  As 
he asserts in his book’s introduction, “until a completely new politics – that is, a politics no 
longer founded on the exceptio of bare life – is at hand, every theory and every praxis will 
remain imprisoned and immobile, and the ‘beautiful day’ of life will be given citizenship only 
either through blood and death or in the perfect senselessness to which the society of the 
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